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The aim of this paper is to analyse how Spanish taxpayers responded to the introduction 
of the dual personal income tax model in 2007. The authors estimate the elasticity of 
taxable income (ETI) with respect to the marginal net tax rate for different groups of 
taxpayers by sex, marital status and age, separating the substitution effect from the income 
effect. For the empirical analysis, the authors use microdata from the Spanish personal 
income tax return panel disseminated by the Spanish Institute of Fiscal Studies. The main 
results show that the 2007 tax reform resulted in a range of elasticity values from 0.41 to 
0.43, while the estimated income effect yields a negative value of –0.18. The results for 
the different taxpayer groups are as follows: the removal of retired people from the 
sample significantly reduces the ETI; elasticity is higher for women than for men; single 
people have a considerably higher elasticity than married taxpayers; and the ETI 
decreases with age. Additionally, the authors find that the marginal cost of public funds 
increased after the reform, and the top marginal tax rate is above optimal. 
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The concept of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate 
is a key tool for analysing taxpayer behaviour in the field of the economics of taxation. As 
opposed to the traditional approach based on labour supply, the calculation of this elasticity can 
capture overall responses to income taxation, such as income shifting, different asset types 
choice, tax evasion or labour changes. Additionally, the ETI can estimate other important 
concepts, such as the deadweight loss of income taxation, the marginal cost of public funds and 
the optimal tax rate. Nevertheless, previous literature has tended to overlook these issues.  
Feldstein (1995) was the first to estimate ETI in a seminal paper applying a single 
difference-in-differences (DID) estimation for United States panel data after the tax reform 
implemented in 1986.1 Since then, the literature studying the ETI has grown continuously as a 
result of the development different toolkits for estimating tax rate changes (Auten and Carroll, 
1999; Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000; Gruber and Saez, 2002). Giertz (2007) and Saez et al. (2012) 
surveyed the methodologies, database and empirical analysis of the ETI. Against this backdrop, 
there is a growing literature on estimated elasticities addressing many unanswered questions 
regarding income shifting, changing tax avoidance behaviour and so on. 
Since the pioneering research by Feldstein (1995), the ETI literature has traditionally 
focused on the United States of America (Austen and Carroll, 1999; Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000; 
Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez, 2001, 2003; Kopczuk, 2005; Giertz, 2007 and Heim, 2009). 
However, literature addressing other countries, such as Canada (Sillamaa and Veall, 2001; Saez 
and Veall, 2005), Denmark (Kleven and Schultz, 2014), Finland (Pirttilä and Selin, 2011; 
Matikka, 2018), Germany (Gottfried and Witczark, 2009), Hungary (Bakos et al., 2008; Kiss 
and Mosberger, 2015), New Zealand (Claus et al., 2012; Creedy and Gemmell, 2013), Norway 
(Aarbu and Thoresen, 2001), Spain (Badenes, 2001; Díaz, 2004, Sanmartín, 2007; Onrubia ‐ 
Fernández and Sanz - Sanz, 2009, Arrazola et al. 2014; Sanz-Sanz et al. 2015); and Sweden 
(Ljunge and Ragan, 2006; Hansson, 2007; Holmlund and Söderström, 2007; Blomquist and 
Selin, 2010) is growing.  
The literature has identified two main problems with regard to the estimation of ETI: (i) the 
control of the mean reversion phenomenon and of the changes in income distribution, which are 
both normally solved in the literature using a logarithm of initial income or spline functions; and 
(ii) the endogeneity problem of the marginal tax rate, for which the usual procedure is to include 
an instrument for the variable. As shown in Section 3, we apply both approaches in order to 
calculate the ETI. In the literature, the results of the ETI estimation range from 0.1 to 1.5, 
depending on both the methodological approach and the specific content of the tax reform. 
However, there are fewer papers that analyse the deadweight loss (Feldstein, 1999), the 
marginal cost of public funds (Creedy, 2010) and the optimal tax rates for personal income taxes 
(Saez 2001, Gruber and Saez, 2002, Saez et al., 2012). 
Thus, the latest reform of the Spanish personal income tax (PIT) structure provides an 
appropriate context for calculating ETI. In fact, the structure of Spanish PIT has, since 2007, 
been semi-dual, with two different bases: the general base, taxed according to a progressive 
_________________________ 
1 Previously, Lindsey (1987) had estimated the United States’ ETI for 1982 and 1984, although this proposal had 
some methodological limitations. 






schedule, and the savings base taxed at a flat tax rate of 18%. This reform altered the 
progressive tax schedule, raising the top marginal income tax rate to 45% (from 43%) and 
increasing the minimum marginal tax rate from 15% to 25%. Other changes, such as the 
definition and the amount of personal and family allowances and other deduction parameters, 
were also introduced by the reform. Nevertheless, this semi-dual PIT differs from the pure 
Nordic dual model in some points. Firstly, not all capital income is taxed at a flat tax rate (i.e., 
rental income and royalties). Secondly, all income from business and professional activities is 
included in the general base, and no distinction is made between self-employed salary and 
capital income regarding business investment return. 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to analyse taxpayers’ behavioural responses to the above PIT 
reform. To do this, we apply the econometric framework proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002). 
In addition, we add some methodological variants to distinguish substitution and income effects. 
Spanish personal income tax return panel microdata for the years 2006 and 2007 have been used 
in the empirical analysis. These data were collected by the Spanish Tax Administration Agency 
(AEAT) and made available by the Spanish Institute of Fiscal Studies (IEF). This database 
represents the entire Spanish taxpayer population in each tax year, providing key economic 
information from the tax return, as well as a set of socio-personal and family variables.  
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, we compute and 
provide a detailed analysis of the ETI for the new semi-dual income tax structure. Secondly, we 
control our estimations by gender, age and marital status. Then, based on the ETI, we estimate 
the deadweight loss and the marginal cost of public funds caused by the reform. Finally, we 
calculate the optimal marginal tax rates according to the elasticities estimated for the population 
as a whole. Based on these findings, we can assess the impact on efficiency costs of the 
introduction of the semi-dual income tax in Spain. Summarizing, our purpose in this paper is 
twofold. First, we intend to enrich the estimation of ETI for (semi-) dual income tax systems. 
And second, we try to get more accurate values for these elasticities taking into account 
different profiles of the taxpayer population. 
Section 2 reports the structure of the Spanish PIT and the main features of the dual reform 
introduced in 2007. Section 3 shows the theoretical framework and the methodological 
approach for calculating the ETI, deadweight loss, marginal cost of public funds and optimal tax 
rates. Section 4 describes the database and discusses the results of the ETI for all taxpayers and 
each of the different groups mentioned above. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a brief 
summary of the major findings.  
2 The 2007 Spanish personal income tax reform  
Pursuant to what was the most important fiscal reform since 1999, a semi-dual model of 
personal income taxation was introduced in 2007 (Law 35/2006) in Spain. This semi-dual model 
differs from the pure Nordic dual model in several points. Note that the previous PIT structure 
was not strictly a synthetic base model. Therefore, some long-term capital gains, included in the 
so-called special base, were taxed at a flat rate of 15%. Even so, the reform applied a new flat 
tax rate of 18% on most of the capital income in the savings base, whereas the capital income 
for non-financial capital (like real estate income, royalties, intellectual and industrial property 






income, and winnings from competitions, games and gambling) was classed in the general base 
and taxed according to a progressive tax schedule together with earned income, pensions, 
unemployment benefits, self-employment and business income. These modifications remain in 
force nowadays, except for the application of a flat rate on the saving base.  
Prior to the reform, the special base for net capital gains (or losses) from assets held for a 
period longer than one year was subject to a tax rate of 15%, whereas other income sources 
were classed in the general base and taxed according to five marginal tax rates ranging from 
15% to 45%. The top marginal rate in the progressive tax schedule was then reduced to 43%, 
and the number of tax brackets was decreased to four. Figure 1 describes the marginal tax rates 
for the respective brackets of “general” taxable income in 2006 and 2007. The new PIT model 
also changed the treatment of both personal and family circumstances, which got transformed 
into non-refundable tax credits (in 2006 they were treated as tax allowances). Besides, the 
reform included several changes in the definition of the amounts and parameters for reductions, 
exemptions and deductions used to calculate the two new taxable bases. Tables A.1 and A.2 in 
the Appendix show the differences between the structure and main parameters before and after 
the PIT reform.  
Figure 1: Spanish PIT marginal tax rates for the years 2006 and 2007 
 
Source: own elaboration. 






3 Theoretical framework  
In this section, we explain the methodology applied to estimate the ETI, as well as the approach 
used to calculate the deadweight loss, the marginal cost of public funds and the optimal tax rate 
for different brackets.  
3.1 Elasticity of taxable income 
The ETI is calculated according to the econometric framework proposed by Gruber and Saez 
(2002). Nevertheless, as shown in Equation 1, we implemented an extended version following 
Bakos et al. (2008) to derive the income effect:2 
∆ log𝑦 = 𝛽𝐶∆log(1− 𝜏) + 𝜂∆log(1 − 𝑡)   (1) 
where 𝛽𝐶 is the ETI with respect to the marginal tax (𝜏) and (𝜂) is the income effect yielded by 
the change in the logarithm of the net average tax rate ∆log(1 − 𝑡). However, the estimation of 
the ETI from Equation 1 is troublesome in two respects. On the one hand, endogeneity is an 
issue to be taken into account because the variations in the marginal tax rate and the average tax 
rate may be caused not only by legal modifications, that is, exogenous changes, but also by 
variations in taxable income, that is, endogenous changes. To rule out an inconsistent estimation 
of both the marginal and average tax rates, we include an instrument for both parameters. 
Particularly, the synthetic marginal tax rate ∆log(1 − 𝜏′) = log�1 − 𝜏2(𝑦�1)� − log�1 − 𝜏1(𝑦1)� 
and the synthetic average tax rate ∆log(1 − 𝑡′) = log�1 − 𝑡2(𝑦�1)� − log�1 − 𝑡1(𝑦1)� are 
calculated for each taxpayer applying the new tax schedule to the pre-reform taxable income 
(i.e., 2006 taxable income), adjusted for inflation (𝑦�1). In this way, the synthetic parameters 
only include the exogenous changes and are estimated using a two-stage instrumental 
regression.  
On the other hand, the well-known regression to the mean is another concern to keep in 
mind. This phenomenon occurs with respect to taxpayers whose income is high (by chance) in 
one period and drops in the following period, thus leading to problems caused by changes in 
income distribution. The existence of mean reversion produces biased estimates, being 
necessary therefore to control it. Following Auten and Carroll (1999) and Moffitt and Wilhelm 
(2000), we include the logarithm of initial incomes to solve the problem.3  
Finally, Equation 2 includes a set of non-time varying socioeconomic variables �𝑥𝑗�, such as 
age, gender, marital status, etc. that we think may influence the dependent variable, and where 
𝑢𝑖 is the error term:   
∆ log𝑦𝑖 = 𝜌 + 𝛽𝐶∆log(1 − ?̂?𝑖) + 𝜂∆log(1 − ?̂?𝑖) + 𝛾 log𝑦𝑖1 +∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗  (2) 
_________________________ 
2 Kiss and Mosberger (2015) apply this approach to estimate the ETI for high earners in Hungary.  
3 Other authors as Heim (2009), Kopczuk (2005) and Weber (2014) include quantile splines to ascertain the 
importance of nonlinearities in elasticity estimates. However, there is no clear evidence on the improvement of the 
results regarding the continuity of the distribution of taxable income in the regressions.  






3.2 Deadweight loss and the marginal cost of public funds 
The deadweight loss (DWL) for each taxpayer is calculated based on the proposal by Feldstein 
(1999) after previously estimating ETI: 




𝛽𝐶𝑦     (3) 
Likewise, the marginal excess burden (MEB) can be calculated in marginal terms, following 
Creedy (2010). Thus, MEB corresponds to the maximum marginal tax rate (𝜏𝑚)  and is 
applied to personal income that exceeds a threshold 𝑧𝜏𝑚. Therefore, it would be determined 
by the following expression: 




�    (4) 
where 𝑧?̅?𝑚   represents the average income of all 𝑁𝜏𝑚 individuals whose income is higher than 
𝑧𝜏𝑚, where 𝛼𝜏𝑚 = 𝑧?̅?𝑚 �𝑧?̅?𝑚  − 𝑧𝜏𝑚�⁄ . 
Thus, MEB can be used to determine the marginal welfare cost (MWC) by merely dividing 




     (5) 
Thus, the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) for the Spanish Personal Income Tax 
application to the last tax bracket would be written as follows:4 
MCPF = 1 + β
Cτmατm
1−τm−βCτmατm
     (6) 
Besides, the above MEB approach can be applied for any bracket k of the tax scale: 




    (7) 
where 𝑁𝑘 is the number of taxpayers classed according to their income in the tax bracket k, 𝑧?̅? is 
the average net taxable income of taxpayers up to tax bracket k, 𝑧𝑘 is the threshold related to 
bracket k, 𝜏𝑘 is the marginal tax rate applicable to bracket k, where 𝛽𝑘𝐶 is the compensated 
(taxable income-net marginal tax rate) elasticity estimated for taxpayers within bracket k of the 
net tax base. Likewise, if 𝛼𝜏𝑘 = 𝑧?̅? (𝑧?̅?  − 𝑧𝑘)⁄ , the expression denoting the marginal welfare 






     (8) 
_________________________ 
4 MCPF is defined in the literature as the welfare cost, in monetary terms, of raising an additional euro of tax 
revenue, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀, (Browning, 1976, 1987). However, there are different ways of measuring MCPF 
depending on how the deadweight loss is calculated (basically whether the prices before or after the change in the 
amounts of tax are taken into account). Dahlby (2008) offers an extensive discussion of MCPF measurement.  













� (1 − τk)    (9) 
Therefore, the marginal cost of public funds paid by taxpayers within bracket k can be 
expressed as denoted in Equation 10 below: 





    (10) 
3.3 Optimal marginal tax rates 
Finally, we estimate the marginal tax rates that minimize the deadweight loss caused by the 
Spanish dual PIT reform. According to Gruber and Saez (2002), the optimal marginal tax rate 
(𝜏∗), which, if applied, maximizes the potential tax revenue raised by considering a single tax 
rate, can be written as shown in Equation 11: 
τ∗ = �1 + βC�−1      (11) 
where 𝛽𝐶 represents the average compensated ETI of all taxpayers. 
Considering a PIT with k marginal tax rates, the optimal marginal tax rate applicable to each 
one of the brackets of the net tax base (𝜏𝑘∗) would be: 
τk∗ = �1 + βkCατk�
−1
     (12) 
4 Data and results 
4.1 Data  
In this section, we briefly describe the Spanish Personal Income Tax Return panel made 
available by the Spanish Institute of Fiscal Studies (IEF), which is used to estimate the ETI. 
Microdata were collected by the Spanish Tax Administration Agency (AEAT). The database is 
an expanded panel of microdata that represents, for every year, the entire Spanish population of 
PIT taxpayers for the so-called "common regime", that is, all tax filers residing in Spanish 
territory, except those who reside in the Autonomous Communities of the Basque Country and 
Navarre (the so-called "Foral regime communities”).6  
_________________________ 
5 Note, in particular, that the maximum marginal tax rate, e.g. 𝛼𝜏𝑘+1 = ∞, and therefore 𝐷𝑘 = 0 should be taken into 
account. 
6 The AEAT is in charge of administering the Spanish PIT in the 15 common regime Autonomous Communities plus 
the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla. In contrast, the Foral regime Autonomous Communities have their own 
tax administrations. Unlike what happens with the AEAT, the Tax Administrations of Basque Country and Navarre 
do not disseminate microdata samples. In any case, we do not believe that the tax elasticities for the Foral regime 






The current panel covers the period from 1999 to 2014. Four characteristics make it suitable 
for tax/income analysis and microsimulation purposes:7 method of stratification according to 
region (Autonomous Community), income level and major income source; minimum variance 
sampling, which leads to income estimations with a relative sampling error of less than 1‰; 
size, ranging from 380,000 to 600,000 observations per year; and low attrition. 
Specifically, the sample used to estimate ETI consists of a balanced panel that includes all 
taxpayers who filed their tax return in 2006 and 2007. Furthermore, we apply the constraint of 
unchanged marital status and household type. We ended up with a sample of 494,591 tax 
returns, representative of a population of 17,760,637 taxpayers.  
To estimate the compensated ETI, we first define the taxable income from all sources of 
income, according to the proposal by Onrubia and Picos (2013). Accordingly, the income for 
both years is homogeneous. As a result, capital gains are not included in taxable income for 
several reasons. Firstly, due to sporadicity, annual capital gains are highly volatile. Secondly, 
taxpayers would be able to anticipate capital gains realizations, which would distort their 
measurement and subsequently the effects of the reform (Burman et al., 1994).8 
Spanish PIT provides two options for taxing married taxpayers since 1988: each spouse is 
taxed individually or, alternatively, both spouses are taxed jointly. Joint taxation is only 
beneficial for those married couples where there is a main income winner. When a spouse 
obtains at least 85–90% of the total taxable income, joint taxation is usually the best choice, 
whereas if the distribution is more egalitarian, to file separate tax returns is more convenient. 
This allows us to establish the follow criterion of income distribution between spouses when 
they file jointly: earned income, pensions, unemployment benefits, self-employment and 
business income are assigned to the main income earner; while capital income and capital gains 
and losses are divided equally between both spouses. This income sharing criterion is in 
accordance with the legislation applicable, inasmuch as earned income, pensions, unemploy-
ment benefits, self-employment and business income are strictly attributable to your legal earner 
or beneficiary, while the capital income must be assigned according to the ownership of the 
assets.9  
Table 1 shows the description and the main statistics for the variables used. The average change 
in the taxable income is positive, as is the net marginal tax rate, both of which denote a 
reduction in the applied marginal tax rate. The average net tax rate suggests that tax revenue 
increases after the reform. The main characteristics of taxpayers reveal that 70% are married 
couples, average age is around 48 years, the majority of taxpayers are male, and the average 
number of descendants is close to one. With respect to the source income structure, we find that 
20% of taxpayers are self-employed workers and professionals, and over 80% receive income 
_________________________ 
autonomous communities were very different from those estimated for the "common regime", because the PIT 
applied in both regimes is substantially the same. 
7 For further information about the description and characteristics of the 1999–2013 Spanish Personal Income Tax 
Return panel, see Onrubia and Picos (2011) and Onrubia et al. (2011). 
8 Díaz-Caro and Crespo (2016) analyze the "lock-in effect" of capital gains for this tax reform.  
9 In Spain, most marriages divide equally the ownership of their assets, according to the legal marital property regime 
(so-called “gananciales regime”). 






from investment and savings, 32% from real estate property and 7% declare capital gains. 
Finally, the main income earners accounted for about 90% of taxable income in 2006. 
 
Table 1: Description of variables and summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean  SD Min Max 
Δ log𝑦 Change in the logarithm of taxable income 0.11 0.94 -14.48 18.30 
Δ log(1 − τ) Change in the logarithm of marginal net 
tax rate 
0.17 0.22 ‐5.82 4.87 
Δ log(1 − 𝜏′)  
Change in the logarithm of synthetic 
marginal net tax rate 0.36 1.23 -10.72 12.64 
Δlog (1 − 𝑡) 
Change in the logarithm of average net tax 
rate 
-0.04 0.58 -10.91 10.47 
Δ log(1 − 𝑡′) 
Change in the logarithm of synthetic 
average net tax rate 
0.17 0.23 -3.92 0.57 
log 𝑦1 Logarithm of initial income (2006) 14.32 1.40 0.00 23.41 
Age Taxpayer age in 2006 48.41 15.53 0.10 106.11 
Gender 
Variable whose value is 1 if the taxpayer 
is male and 0 if the taxpayer is female. 
0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Number of children 
Number of taxpayer children included in 
the concept of minimum family allowance 
for descendants.  
0.93 0.83 0.00 20.00 
Self-employed 
Variable whose value is 1 if the taxpayer 
filed tax returns in relation to economic 
activities in 2006 and 0 otherwise. 




Variables whose value is 1 if the taxpayer 
received income from these categories 
respectively in 2006 and 0 otherwise.  
0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Income from real 
estate property 
0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Capital Gains 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Marital Status 
Variable whose value is 0 if the taxpayer 
is a single, widowed or separated person, 
with or without minors, and 1 if the 
taxpayer is married. 
0.70 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Percentage of income 
of main income 
earner 
Variable whose value is either 0 or 1 
depending on the percentage of the total 
taxable income of the tax unit accounted 
for by the income of the main income 
earner (1 for unmarried individuals and 
married couples with only one wage 
earner). 
0.90 0.20 0.00 1.00 
      
Note: Values of variables for the 2006 fiscal year.  
Source: own elaboration from Spanish Personal Income Tax Return Panel for year 2006 and 2007. 






Dual or semi-dual income taxes pose a particular problem with regard to the selection of the 
marginal tax rate for estimating the ETI. In fact, taxpayers face two marginal tax rates, referring 
to the general and the savings base, respectively. Also, we should not overlook that one 
advantage of calculating such elasticities is that they can take into account the possible shift 
between the two tax base categories.10 Consequently, we take up the idea that a weighting of 
the two marginal tax rates applied to each taxpayer is the actually relevant rate for decision 
making to be considered. With that in mind, we adapt the conventional estimation framework 
incorporating the weighted marginal tax rate, ?̅?, calculated for each taxpayer following Onrubia 







𝜏𝐴     (13) 
where superscripts G and A represent the general and savings components of the tax bases (z) 
and the respectively applicable marginal tax rates. 
4.2 Results 
In this section, we report the results of the elasticities estimations for the whole sample and for 
the previously defined taxpayer groups. We also include the results for deadweight loss, 
efficiency cost and optimal tax rate using the calculated compensated ETI.  
4.2.1 Elasticity of taxable income 
Table 2 reports the main results after estimating the compensated ETI for the total sample 
according to a two-step procedure using instrumental variables as described in Section 3. As 
regards the exogeneity conditions corr(𝑍𝑖 ,𝑢𝑖) = 0 and relevance corr(𝑍𝑖,𝑢𝑖) ≠ 0 required for 
instruments (𝑍𝑖) of the respective variables (𝑋𝑖), we conduct a Sargan-Hansen test to check that 
they are met, yielding the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic to verify the null hypothesis 
that the equation is overidentified. Besides, we performed F-tests, related to the first stage of the 
econometric estimation, for both instruments. The resulting values are shown in Table 2. This 
Table contains four columns which successively add control variables to the main model 
(Column 1) that includes only the net marginal tax rate. Column 2 adds the logarithm of the 
initial income. Column 3 includes the average net-of-tax rate, and, finally, Column 4 adds the 
socioeconomic control variables. 
 
_________________________ 
10 López-Laborda et al. (2018) have recently analyzed income shifting in the Spanish dual PIT. 
11 Despite the fact that the previous tax model also had two tax bases, the weighted tax rate incorporation is merely 
relevant to the PIT introduced in 2007. In the 2006 PIT model, the "special base" only consisted of capital gains and 
losses, whilst the rest of the savings income was taxed in the general base (jointly with the labour, professional and 
business income, rents and other income from non-financial capital). For both tax models, the specific incomes taxed 
in each base are detailed in table A.1 (entitled "Income classification"). 
 






 Table 2: Elasticity of taxable income estimates using Spanish PIT 2006 and 2007 
𝚫 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒚 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Δ log(1 − 𝜏) -0.658*** 0.453*** 0.427*** 0.415*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Δlog (1 − 𝑡)     -0.208*** -0.184*** 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
log 𝑦1   -0.558*** -0.559*** -0.591*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age       0.021*** 
        (0.000) 
Age2       0.000*** 
        (0.000) 
Gender       0.102*** 
        (0.002) 
Number of children       0.057*** 
        (0.001) 
Self-employed       -0.131*** 
        (0.002) 
Income from investments and savings       0.060*** 
        (0.003) 
Income from real estate property       0.161*** 
        (0.002) 
Capital gains       0.094*** 
        (0.004) 
Marital status       0.036*** 
        (0.002) 
Percentage of income of main taxpayer       -0.074*** 
        (0.005) 
Autonomous Communities              Yes         
Constant 0.226*** 8.060*** 8.069*** 8.006*** 




Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic 1.30E+05 1.40E+05 1.20E+04 1.20E+04 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J statistic         
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Marginal tax rate 3,200,000 1,700,000 1,200,000 2,700,000 
Average tax rate     5540.51 1512.75 
Observations 494.591 494.591 494.591 494.591 
     
Notes: Results of the robust regression instrumental variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
* Denotes significance at 10% (p<0.10); ** significance at 5% (p<0.05); and *** significance at 1% (p<0.01). 
For the regional component, the dummy included a region variable for the number of taxpayers and taxable income, 
whose baseline is the capital Madrid; they are all negative and statistically significant, except Ceuta and Melilla. 
Kleibergen H0: underidentified model. Hansen J H0: overidentified model. 
Source: own elaboration from Spanish Personal Income Taxpayers Panel for the years 2006 and 2007. 
 
Analysing the main results, we find that the ETI is negative in the first regression, although 
it is positive after introducing the 2006 income logarithm. Regression to the mean is a 
phenomenon often reported in the literature and is known to influence this variable in the 
estimation. On the other hand, when the net average tax rate is included, the ETI is slightly 






lower, and all variables are significant at 99%. The coefficient of the net average tax rate 
indicates that a 1% increase in the actual average tax rate would reduce taxable income by 
0.20%. Control variables influence the ETI, leading to a slight decrease from 0.457 to 0.415. 
According to these results, the compensated ETI for the 2007 Spanish personal income tax 
reform ranges from 0.415 to 0.453, values within the interval reported by the international 
literature.  
Particularly, taxpayer age has a positive, albeit smaller, influence on taxable income in 
response to the changes in marginal tax rates, although this effect decreases as the age increases 
(negative effect of age squared). Taxpayer gender shows that males have a bigger influence on 
the change in taxable income than females, and the number of children has a positive, albeit 
rather small, effect. Being married also has a positive influence. 
On the other hand, self-employment has a noticeable negative effect, for which there are 
several reasons. These taxpayers may not declare all their income because this is harder to 
control. Additionally, they have the option of paying taxes under the module-based objective 
estimation system, paying considerably less than under the direct estimation system which is 
based on accounting records. Accordingly, the income filed by the self-employed shows a lower 
variability over time than the other income sources, with the consequent impact on the values of 
the estimated elasticities. 
The sources of taxable income like financial investments and savings, real estate property 
and capital gains have a significant and positive influence on the change in taxable income, 
where real estate property has the biggest impact. On the contrary, the percentage of income 
accounted for the main income earner in the case of married couples has a negative impact. This 
makes sense, as it indicates that the change in taxable income would be smaller if the family tax 
unit was more dependent on the main income earner. Finally, the region variable has an 
influence, albeit rather small, on changes in taxable income.  
4.2.2 ETI sensitivity analysis by groups 
As mentioned in the introduction, we estimate the ETI for different groups of taxpayers in order 
to conduct a sensitivity analysis of elasticity estimates. Table 3 shows the ETI estimation for the 
following groups: the restricted sample (excluding retired and unemployed taxpayers), gender, 
age, marital status.12 The results shown also include the income effect and logarithm of initial 
income. 
Table 3 refers to the restricted sample built according a two-step procedure. Firstly, we 
remove retired taxpayers from the sample to further investigate the effect that this has and then 
we also take out unemployed taxpayers. The results show that the exclusion of retired 
individuals lowers the ETI, the income effect and the initial income. Therefore, the response of 
working-age taxpayer population is lower than the calculated response for all taxpayers.  
 
_________________________ 
12 In order to identify retired and unemployed taxpayers, we have used the variables of the taxpayer's age and 
deductible social contributions.  
 






Table 3: Elasticity of taxable income estimates by groups using Spanish PIT 2006 and 2007 
Taxpayer group ETI Income effect Log initial income 
Employment 
Situation 
Without Retired 0.390*** -0.171*** -0.629*** 
(-0.008) (-0.004) (-0.002) 
Without Retired + Unemployed 0.316*** -0.162*** -0.607*** 
(-0.008) (-0.004) (-0.002) 
Gender Women 0.470*** -0.200*** -0.551*** 
(-0.012) (-0.007) -(0.004) 
Men 0.387*** -0.174*** -0.605*** 
 (-0.008)    (-0.005)    (-0.002)    
Marital  
Status 
Single 0.648*** -0.191*** -0.639*** 
(-0.014) -(0.007) (-0.003) 
Married 0.320*** -0.177*** -0.564*** 
(-0.007) (-0.005) (-0.002) 
Age  30 and under 0.702*** -0.148*** 0.769*** 
(-0.024) (-0.009) (-0.005) 
From 31 to 64 0.353*** -0.176*** -0.6*** 
-0.008 -0.005 (-0.002) 
65 and over 0.262*** -0.156*** -0.343*** 
(-0.014) (-0.011) (-0.007) 
Single Woman 0.663*** -0.22*** -0.595*** 
(-0.018) (-0.011) (-0.005) 
Woman <30 0.768*** -0.148*** -0.761*** 
(-0.038) (-0.016) (-0.014 
Woman >31 and <=64 0.737*** -0.244*** -0.58*** 
(-0.028) (-0.018) (-0.007) 
Woman >64 0.238*** -0.128*** -0.287*** 
(-0.028) (-0.024) (-0.021) 
Man 0.598*** -0.163*** -0.668*** 
(-0.022) (-0.009) (-0.004) 
Man <30 0.784*** -0.133*** -0.779*** 
(-0.042) (-0.013) (-0.007) 
Man >31 and <=64 0.531*** -0.165*** -0.652*** 
(-0.032) (-0.014) (-0.005) 
Man >64 0.298*** -0.128*** -0.356*** 
(-0.040) (-0.029) (-0.022) 
Married Woman 0.222*** -0.161*** -0.480*** 
(-0.015) (-0.012) (-0.007) 
Woman <30 0.337*** -0.231*** -0.743*** 
(-0.072) (-0.042) (-0.018) 
Woman >31 and <=64 0.179*** -0.147*** -0.481*** 
(-0.017) (-0.011) (-0.008) 
Woman >64 0.235*** -0.167*** -0.355*** 
(-0.049) (-0.033) (-0.028) 
Man 0.335*** -0.175*** -0.579*** 
(-0.008) (-0.005) (-0.002) 
Man <30 0.465*** -0.117*** -0.802*** 
(-0.056) (-0.018) (-0.010) 
Man >31 and <=64 0.279*** -0.164*** -0.612*** 
(-0.011) (-0.006) (-0.002) 
Man >64 0.268*** -0.162*** -0.354*** 
(-0.018) (-0.014) (-0.009) 
Notes: Results of the robust regression instrumental variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
Denotes significance at 10% (p<0.10); ** significance at 5% (p<0.05); and *** significance at 1% (p<0.01). 
Source: own elaboration from Spanish Personal Income Taxpayers Panel for the years 2006 and 2007. 






Table 4: Elasticity of taxable income estimates by income level (2007 tax bracket)  
using Spanish PIT 2006 and 2007 
𝚫 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒚   Coefficient ETI 
Δ log(1 − 𝜏)   0.370*** 0.370 
    (0.008)  Δ log(1 − 𝜏) x bracket 2   0.081*** 0.451 
   (0.006)  
Δ log(1 − 𝜏) x bracket 3   0.458*** 0.828 
   (0.005)  
Δ log(1 − 𝜏) x bracket 4   0.853*** 1.223 
   (0.007)  
Δ log(1 − 𝜏) x bracket 5   1.071*** 1.441 
   (0.022)  
Δlog (1 − 𝑡)    -0.080***  
     (0.004)  
log 𝑦1    -0.665***  
     (0.002)  
Age    0.011***  
     (0.000)  
Age2    -0.000***  
     (0.000)  
Gender    0.081***  
     (0.002)  
Number of children    0.073***  
     (0.001)  
Self-employed    -0.103***  
     (0.003)  
Income from investments and savings   0.035***  
     (0.003)  
Income from real estate property    0.127***  
     (0.002)  
Capital gains    0.051***  
     (0.004)  
Marital status    0.106***  
     (0.003)  
Percentage of income of main taxpayer    0.034***  
     (0.005)  
Autonomous Communities    yes         
Constant   9.022***  





Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic   8,113.605  
p-value   (0.000)  
Hansen J statistic       
p-value   (0.000)  
Marginal tax rate   175,000  
Average tax rate    1,267.79  
Observations   494.591  
Notes: Results of the robust regression instrumental variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
* Denotes significance at 10% (p<0.10); ** significance at 5% (p<0.05); and *** significance at 1% (p<0.01). 
For the regional component, the dummy included a region variable for the number of taxpayers and taxable income, 
whose baseline is the capital Madrid; they are all negative and statistically significant, except Ceuta and Melilla. 
Kleibergen H0: underidentified model. Hansen J H0: overidentified model. 
Source: own elaboration from Spanish Personal Income Taxpayers Panel for the years 2006 and 2007. 






Likewise, after removing unemployed individuals from the sample, we observe a reduction in 
the ETI. Changes in employment status (employed and unemployed) offer a possible 
explanation for this phenomenon, causing a high variability in taxable income. With regard to 
gender, and consistent with the literature, we find that women have a higher ETI and income 
effect than men. 
With regard to marital status, the ETI for single taxpayers is higher than for married 
taxpayers (0.648 to 0.32) and the sample as a whole. The income effect is somewhat lower for 
single taxpayers, as expected according to the literature. With respect to age, we consider three 
representative taxpayer age groups. The ETI clearly decreases with increasing age (from 0.702 
to 0.262), that is, there is a lower effect as taxpayers get older. The ETI of 0.262 for the 65-and-
older age group is consistent with the fact that a substantial part of their income is constant due 
to pension. Similarly, note that the ETI of taxpayers aged from 31 to 64 years is similar to the 
figure estimated for the whole sample.  
Combining marital status with gender and age group, we find that the ETI for single, women 
taxpayers is slightly higher than for single men, whereas the results are inverted for married 
couples, where women (0.222) have a lower elasticity than men (0.335). With respect to the 
income effect, it is smaller for single males than for single women, whereas the opposite applies 
for married taxpayers. 
With regard to age, the ETI shows a decreasing evolution as age increases, for both men and 
women, regardless of whether they are single or married. Note that the ETI for single women is 
only higher than for single men within the 31-to-64 years age group and lower in the other two 
groups. For married taxpayers, the ETI is higher for men by age group. Otherwise, the control 
variables do not indicate any major changes across different groups of variable estimations.  
Finally, Table 4 presents the ETI estimates for each of the taxable income brackets of the 
progressive tax schedule. The findings show that the tax bracket ETI increases for larger 
incomes, which indicates a higher response for top- than bottom-income bracket taxpayers, as 
would be expected according to the literature. 
The values of the ETI for each tax bracket shown in the last column of Table 4 are 
calculated as follows. For bracket 1, the value of the elasticity coincides with the value of the 
estimated coefficient (0.370), while for each of the remaining brackets, the elasticity is the sum 
of that first coefficient plus the coefficient of the corresponding tax bracket (so, for the bracket 
2, the ETI is 0.451, that is to say, 0.370 plus 0.451, and for bracket 3, the ETI is 0.828, that is to 
say, 0.37 plus 0.458, and so on). 
4.2.3 Deadweight loss and marginal cost of public funds 
In this section, we report the results after estimating the ETI values for different tax brackets of 
taxable income (see Table 5) in order to calculate the deadweight loss and marginal cost of 
public funds related to the 2007 Spanish PIT reform. Table 5 shows the marginal excess burden 
(MEB) and the marginal welfare cost (MWC) for 2006 and 2007, as well as the variations in 
each case. Note that the biggest increase occurred in tax bracket 1, which increased from a 
marginal cost of 0.08 (2006) to 0.33 (2007) euro. This is equivalent to a cost increase of 0.25  
 






T able 5: Deadweight loss and marginal cost of public funds for Spanish PIT in 2006 and 2007 (average value in euros) 
    2006 2007 2006 - 2007 
Bracket Elasticity Taxpayers 𝒚� Tax Liability MEB MWC 𝒚� Tax Liability MEB MWC ∆𝐌𝐌𝐌 
1 0.370 6,006,369 12,295.99 663.29 51.27 0.08 17,832.88 1,636.11 533.97 0.33 0.25 
2 0.451 5,902,355 18,841.72 2,165.11 307.31 0.14 21,190.23 2,059.57 344.70 0.17 0.03 
3 0.828 3,568,102 29,933.39 5,245.82 1,181.60 0.23 32,417.21 4,876.24 1,276.64 0.27 0.04 
4 1.223 1,742,285 46,329.70 10,461.24 5,855.52 0.57 49,406.57 10,743.79 6,227.88 0.58 0.01 
5 1.441 763,355 106,000.00 34,479.11 25,927.83 0.75 113,000.00 35,699.64 27,370.66 0.76 0.01 
All 0.415 17.982.469          
Source: own elaboration from Spanish Personal Income Taxpayers panel for the years 2006 and 2007. 
Table 6: Optimal marginal tax rates (average values in euros and percentages) 
Bracket 𝐙𝐤 
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NOTE: * Weighted marginal tax rates calculated proportionally to the general and savings tax bases for each bracket  
Source: own elaboration from Spanish personal income taxpayers panel for the years 2006 and 2007. 
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euro for each additional euro of tax revenue. As far as the other four brackets are concerned, the 
increase in welfare costs is considerably lower (0.03 for tax bracket 2, 0.04 for tax bracket 3 and 
0.01 for tax brackets 4 and 5). The increment in bracket 1 can be explained by the significant 
change in the minimum marginal tax rate (from 15% to 24%) and the changes in the treatment 
of personal and family circumstances (non-refundable tax credits instead of a reduction in 
taxable income). 
4.2.4 Optimal tax rates 
Finally, Table 6 shows the optimal tax rates for the whole sample and the different tax brackets, 
providing a comprehensive analysis of the tax reform. We highlight (by shading) those optimal 
tax rates resulting from the combination of each tax income bracket of the dual 2007 PIT and 
the estimated value of the ETI. Moreover, the result for the overall taxpayers is shown in the last 
row of the table. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the optimal tax rate decreases as the income increases. This is a 
logical result since, as expected, the estimated ETI decreases with income. In other words, high-
income taxpayers are more responsive  to the marginal tax rate (for their higher elasticity), while 
low-income taxpayers show lower responsiveness (for their lower elasticity). 
Analysing the results by income levels, we can see that the optimal marginal tax rate for tax 
bracket 1 would oscillate between 71% and 77%, where the compensated ETI in this bracket is 
0.36. These optimal tax rates are above the marginal tax rate of 24% applied in 2007 and the 
weighted marginal tax rate of 23.46%. Therefore, the ETI in tax bracket 2 is 0.44 and the 
optimal marginal tax rate is around 61% to 66%, again above the marginal tax rate (24%) and 
the weighted tax rate (23.73%). The situation for tax bracket 3 is similar to tax bracket 2, 
whereas both tax brackets 4 and 5 have an optimal tax rate (24% to 26% and 27% to 29%, 
respectively), lower than the applied marginal tax rate (37% and 43%) and the respective 
weighted marginal tax rate (36% and 40%). On the other hand, looking at the overall 
compensated elasticity of 0.43, we find that the weighted marginal tax rate would be 
significantly below the optimal marginal tax rate of 45%, given that the maximum marginal tax 
rate for the general bases is set at 43% and the savings bases at 18%.  
According to Figure 1, the situation with regard to optimal marginal tax rates is unaffected 
by the marginal tax rates readjustment generated by the 2007 reform. Hence, the first three tax 
rates established for the 2006 general bases (15%, 24% and 28%) score below the optimum, 
whereas the marginal tax rates of 37% and 45% are considerably above the optimal marginal tax 
rate of 29%. In light of these results, it is reasonable to assume that a process whereby marginal 
tax rates are restructured, including a decrease in the top marginal tax rates, could maintain tax 
revenues and, at the same time, optimize welfare costs.  
Consequently, we should not overlook the fact that the usual progressive structure of 
personal income taxes is justified because of the redistributive role attributed to them. Although 
it is not an absolute mathematical condition, it is usual that real-world personal income taxes 
apply a progressive rate schedule with increasing marginal tax rates (applicable, in our case, to 
the "general taxable income"). However, this redistributive requirement is not incompatible with 
the reduction of the marginal tax rates corresponding to taxable income brackets 4 and 5, 
provided that the structure of increasing marginal tax rates is maintained. 




The elasticity of taxable income has evolved into a basic tool for evaluating the optimal tax rate 
and efficiency cost of tax reforms to the detriment of the traditional approach based on labour 
supply. This paper analyses the ETI of the dual income taxation system introduced by the 2007 
Spanish tax reform in order to account for as many taxpayer behaviours as possible: income 
shifting, the choice of different asset types, tax evasion and labour changes, etc. Accordingly, 
this paper contributes to the literature by reporting the ETI estimations for different taxpayer 
groups. From these results, we calculate the deadweight loss, the efficiency cost and the optimal 
marginal tax rate for the dual income tax reform. 
Although quiet similar in structure to the original model, with two types of taxable income 
and two tax schedules, the semi-dual model deployed by the reform differs from the pure Nordic 
dual income taxation on a number of points. We believe that the reform establishes an incentive 
for taxpayers to vary their taxable income. For empirical purposes, we used the Spanish 
Personal Income Tax Return panel for the 2006 and 2007 tax years. In particular, we build a 
balanced panel database including taxpayers who filed in both years.  
The highlighted results reveal that the 2007 PIT reform led to several relevant changes in 
taxpayer behaviour. Specifically, the value of the compensated ETI ranges from 0.41 to 0.43 for 
the whole sample. The income effect, which is measured based on the change in average net tax 
rates, leads to a negative value of -0.18, indicating an increase in the effective average tax rate 
due to the reform. These values can be considered within the range of those given by the 
literature for most developed countries, although significantly lower than those obtained for 
Spain, as can be seen in the references cited in the introduction. 
Several socio-personal and family variables have been identified as having a positive 
influence on the intensity of the change in taxable income, such as taxpayer age, gender, the 
number of dependent children, and the declaration of financial capital gains or rental income. 
On the contrary, variables that have a negative influence on the change in taxable income are 
age squared, the declaration of income from self-employment and being the main income earner 
in a married couple. We have also identified a slight, albeit non-significant, variability in the 
responses depending on the Autonomous Community of residence.  
Furthermore, as stated in the introduction, we pursued to contribute to the literature by 
obtaining differentiated ETI values for different profiles of taxpayers usually considered 
relevant. Thus, we have calculated the compensated ETI for some taxpayer groups reaching the 
following conclusions: the removal of retired people from the sample significantly reduces the 
ETI; elasticity is higher for women than for men; single people have a considerably higher 
elasticity than married taxpayers; and the ETI decreases with age. All these results are in line 
with those traditionally pointed by the economics of taxation.  
Besides, when we use the ETI value to estimate the deadweight loss and the marginal cost 
of public funds, we find that the cost is higher than with the previous design. Therefore, the 
welfare cost increases with the taxpayer’s income bracket. This increase is mainly due to the 
sizable change in the marginal tax rate of Bracket 1, which increased from 15% to 24%, 
although simultaneously personal and family allowances were transformed into tax credits.  
Finally, we estimate the optimal marginal tax rate based on the ETI for different tax 
brackets. These estimations show that the optimal marginal tax rate for the tax considered as a 
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whole (between 45% and 51%, according to a range of elasticities, respectively, between 0.5 
and 0.4) is above the top two marginal tax rates established by the reform (43% and 18%). 
Therefore, the marginal tax rate could be readjusted according to the actual tax schedule to 
minimize the efficiency cost, maintaining the structure with increasing marginal tax rates of the 
schedule applied to the “general taxable income”. 
To conclude, we discuss some policy implications of these findings: 
• In view of the values of the elasticities obtained, it seems prudent to recognize that the 
marginal tax rates applied after the 2007 PIT reform were not, in general, excessively distorting 
for the redistributed goals achieved. However, looking to the future, we believe that a 
restructuring of the width of the tax brackets, along the income distribution, could contribute to 
reduce the efficiency costs of the PIT and maximizing the tax collection. In any case, these 
changes should be combined with marginal tax rates never higher than the optimal “total PIT” 
marginal rate, which would allow maintaining the structure of marginal tax rates increasing with 
income in the “general” tax scale.  
• Looking to future tax reforms, the estimated lower elasticities for both, women and 
taxpayers under the age of 30, advise the incorporation of targeted measures to reduce the 
marginal tax rates of both groups. In the opposite direction, lower elasticities of retired 
taxpayers may recommend a revision of their current generalized tax benefits, possibly 
reorienting them exclusively towards those retirees with lower income levels. 
• This kind of efficiency-oriented tax reforms cannot be designed apart from the 
redistributive objectives of the PIT. The aim is to find a balance between these two tax 
principles that maximize its revenues, which, together with the degree of progressivity, will 
determine the redistributive capacity of the tax. Of course, the importance of fighting tax 
evasion and avoidance must not be forgotten. A wide concealment of income causes that 
progressivity ends up acting on the most easily controllable income, generally those of 
employees and pensioners. 
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Table A.1: Structure of Spanish Personal Income Tax, years 2006 and 2007 
Concept 2006 Spanish PIT 2007 Spanish PIT 
Computation of gross income 
Different types of income: labour income, savings income, self-
employment income and business income, spousal support, rental 
income, imputed income for non-rented houses, income attributions, and 
capital gains and losses 
Reductions (applied for 
calculating incomes) 
Rental income deduction and 
irregular income reduction 
Earned income deduction, rental 
income deduction and irregular 
income reduction 
Income classification 
(applied for calculating 
adjusted gross income and 
taxable income) 
General base: Labour income, 
savings income, self-
employment income, spousal 
support, rental income, imputed 
income for non-rented houses, 
income attributions, and capital 
gains and losses≤1 year 
Special base: Capital gains and 
losses> 1 year 
General base: Labour income, self-
employment income, spousal support, 
rental income, imputed income for 
non-rented houses, income 
attributions, and capital gains and 
losses 
Savings base: Income from savings, 
and capital gains and losses 
Adjusted gross income  Sum of incomes minus personal and descendant allowances Sum of incomes 
Taxable income  
Adjusted gross income minus 
earned income deduction, 
ascendant, age and disability 
allowances, spousal support and 
pension schemes allowances 
Taxable income minus allowances for 
joint taxation, spousal support and 
pension schemes allowances  
Gross tax liability  
Results of applying respectively 
the general and special schedule 
to general and special taxable 
income 
Results of applying respectively the 
general and savings schedule to the 
general and savings taxable income, 
minus the result of applying tax 
schedules to the sum of personal and 
family allowances 
The general and special (savings) schedules are divided into state and 
regional parts 
Final tax liability Gross tax liability minus state and regional tax credits 
Refundable tax credits For maternity (applying to working mothers) 
For maternity and childbirth 
(applying to working mothers)  
Source: Onrubia et al. (2014) and own elaboration. 
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Table A.2: Main parameters of the Spanish Personal Income Tax, years 2006 and 2007  
Concepts 2006 PIT 2007 PIT 
Reduction for irregular income  40% 40% 
Reduction for earned income 2,400  - 3,500  2,600  - 4,000  
Increment for disability  +2,800  /+6,200  +2,800  /+6,200  
Late retirement and geographical 
mobility +100% for either concept +100% for either concept 









5,050   
 
Increment for age +800  /+1,800  +900  /+ 2,000  






2,150 a   
Descendants allowances 1,400 /  -2,300  1,800 /  -4,100  
Increment for age +1,200  per child < 3 years +2,200   < 3 years 
Ascendant allowances 800  /1,800  900  /2,000  
Disability allowances 2,000 /  -7,000  2,270 /  - 9,170  
General tax schedules (State + 
Autonomous Community) 
15% - 24% - 28% - 37% - 
45%  24% - 28% - 37% -43% 
Limits for pension scheme reductions 8,000  / 24,250  10,000  / 12,500  30%/50% (b+c) 
Tax rate for special / savings base 15% 18% 
Tax credit on housing investment 15% / 25% 15% 
Tax credit for maternity 100 per month (from birth to 3 years old) 
100 per month (from birth to 
3 years old) 
Tax credit for childbirth or adoption  - 2,500  per child 
NOTES: (a) Applied as taxable income reduction, the other reductions are applicable as tax credits; (b) net labor 
income; (c) self-employment income and business income. Amounts in euro. 
Source: Onrubia et al., (2014) and own elaboration. 
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